The role of monetary policy in dealing with inflation and high interest rates by Darryl R. Francis
Mn. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE CoMMInnn:
Ia mpleased to have this opportunity to present my
views regarding our country’s inflation and high inter-
est rates and the role of monetary policy in dealing
with these and other economic problems.
My position regarding the cause of inflation and
high market interest rates is that they both stem from
the same source — an excessive trend rate of expan-
sion of the nation’s money stock. Monetary policy,
therefore, can contribute to solving both of these
problems over a period of a few years by fostering a
non-inflationary rate of growth of the money supply.
I believe that the historically rapid rate of money
growth of the past few years has caused an excessive
rate of expansion of total spending in the economy.
Since rapid money growth has stimulated a growth in
demand for goods and services at rates much faster
than our ability to produce, inflation has resulted.
The relationship between expansion of the money
stock and the rate of inflation is illustrated in Chart I.
The money stock, defined as demand deposits and
currency held by the nonbank public, increased slowly
from early 1952 to late 1962. Since then, the average
rate of money growth has persistently accelerated. As
indicated in Chart I, the general price index, meas-
ured by the GNP deflator, has risen, with a few quar-
ters lag, at rates similar to growth of the money stock
(except during Phases I and II of the price and wage
controls when reported prices were artificially held
down).
High and rising market rates of interest go hand-
in-hand with a high and accelerating rate of inflation.
This is because lenders and borrowers of funds take
into consideration their expectations with reference to
the future rate of inflation. Lenders desire a market
rate of interest which provides them a real rate of re-
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turn plus a premium based on their expectations re-
garding the future rate of inflation. Also, during infla-
tion borrowers are willing to pay a higher market rate
of interest because they expect the prices of their
products to rise, and they wish to avoid the higher
construction and other costs associated with delaying
new projects. Thus, the interaction of demand and
supply in the market for funds during a period of
inflation results in market interest rates which embody
an inflation premium.
This response of interest rates to inflation is illus-
trated in Chart I. During the period of a slowly rising
general price level in the l95Os and early 1960s, the
seasoned corporate Aaa bond rate rose slowly until
1959 and subsequently remained little changed
through 1965. Then, with accelerating inflation, this
average of highest quality long-term market interest
rates rose steadily for five years. It was relatively
stable in 1971 and 1972, probably reflecting expecta-
tions of less rapid inflation as a result of Phases I and
II of the price and wage control program. During that
period the reported rate of inflation decreased to less
than 3 percent. However, the renewed acceleration of
inflation since early 1973 has been accompanied by a
gradual, but marked, increase in the corporate Aaa
bond rate.
According to my view of the relationships which
run from an increase in the trend growth of money,
to a higher rate of inflation, to higher market rates of
interest, present high interest rates do not indicate
restrictive monetary actions. On the contrary, they are
the result of excessively expansionary monetary ac-
tions since the early 1960s.
A natural question to be asked at this point is,
“What has caused the observed trend growth of
money?” My view is that growth of the monetary base
is the prime determinant of growth of the money
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stock. The major sources of growth in the base are
changes in the volume of Federal Government debt
purchased by the Federal Reserve System on the
open market, and occasional changes in the quantity
or price of gold held by the Treasury. A change in the
monetary base changes the amount of reserves in the
banking system, which changes the amount of deposits
created by commercial banks.
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Movements in the narrowly defined money stock
over extended periods of time are closely associated
with movements in the monetary base. Tiers 4 and 5
of Chart II illustrate this very close relationship, while
the top three tiers show the relation between growth
of the outstanding Federal Government debt and that
portion held by the Federal Reserve System.
In my opinion, the actions that led to the accelera-
tion in growth of the monetary base and money sup-
ply since the early 1960s occurred as a result of: (1)
excessive preoccupation with the prevailing level of
market interest rates; (2) the occurrence of large de-
ficits in the Federal Government budget; and (3)
shifting emphasis of policy actions because of an ap-
parent short-run trade-off between inflation and
unemployment.
Some people believe that the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem has a high degree of control over market interest
rates. They argue that System open market purchases
and sales of Government securities should be so con-
ducted as to assure that unduly high market interest
rates do not choke-off growth of output and employ-
ment. Throughout most of the 1960s, and to some
extent in the 1970s, the published Record of Policy
Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee indi-
cates that the conduct of open market transactions
was influenced, in considerable measure, by these two
propositions. Once accelerating inflation started in the
mid-1960s, and market interest rates began to rise
reflecting an inflation premium, the System purchased
Government securities in increasing quantities in an
attempt to hold interest rates at the then prevailing
levels. Such purchases resulted in rapid growth in
both the monetary base and the money stock, In spite
of the efforts to maintain a prevailing level, market
interest rates continued to rise.
I accept neither the proposition that the Federal
Reserve can control market interest rates nor that the
high market interest rates have acted to choke-off
economic expansion. Past experience, in my opinion,
indicates quite conclusively that the Federal Reserve
has little ability to control the level of market interest
rates for any extended period of time. Experience also
indicates, for both this and other countries, that
growth of total spending has been retarded very little
by high interest rates. On the other hand, attempts to
resist upward movements in market interest rates have
resulted in faster growth of money.
Another concern which has been expressed about
market interest rates is that they should be controlled
in order to prevent dislocations in the flows of funds
to savings institutions, the housing industry, and state
and local governments. In addition, there is a com-
monly-held view that small businesses, farmers, and
the average consumer should not have to pay high
interest rates when they borrow. The published policy
Record indicates that the Federal Reserve responded
to such concerns at various times over the past ten
years, especially following the credit crnnches of 1966
and 1969-70.
Good though the intentions may have been, I am
convinced that monetary actions based on these views
have been self-defeating. As explained earlier, such
attempts to maintain nominal interest rates below
their free market level in a period of inflationary up-
ward pressure has resulted in accelerating money
growth, an acceleration in inflation, and still higher
interest rates. Thus, those presumed to be protected
by such a course of monetary actions actually turn out
to be worse off — they end up with both more infla-
tion and higher interest rates.
Another concern regarding market interest rates re-
lates to the Federal Reserve’s role in the orderly mar-
keting of U.S. Government debt. This refers to the
so-called “even-keel” operations, which have had a
long tradition in central banking. When new Govern-
ment securities are issued, there is additional demand
for credit and temporary upward pressure on market
interest rates normally occurs. Since changes in inter-
est rates traditionally have been viewed as interfering
with the orderly process of marketing new issues,
fluctuations of market rates during the financing pe-
riod have been limited by purchases of securities on
the open market which, in turn, add to the monetary
base.
The published Record indicates that during much
of the period of accelerating inflation System open
market operations were constrained by “even-keel”
considerations. Furthermore, System purchases of se-
curities during even-keel periods were riot fully offset
by subsequent sales and, as a result, money growth
accelerated.
This process, in effect, has resulted in at least par-
tial financing of Government deficits through the
creation of money rather than borrowing from the
private sector. In many other countries the same re-
sult has occurred by the simple and direct expedient
of the Government printing the money which is then
spent on goods and services.
Since the direct method of printing money to fi-
nance Government expenditures is prohibited in the
U.S., the monetization of Government deficits has oc-
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curred indirectly. Our deficit spending is always fi-
nanced, at least initially, through the sale of new
Government securities to the public. But when the
Federal Reserve System buys outstanding securities
from the public, a part of the Government debt is ul-
timately being financed by the creation of new
money. This is because the Federal Reserve System
pays for the securities purchased on the open market
by creating a credit to member bank reserve accounts,
which increases the monetary base and money held
by the public.
Charts II and III illustrate the results of the process
described above. The increases in Government debt
and the amounts of debt that have been purchased by
the public and the Federal Reserve System are shown
in the first column of Chart III. The proportion of debt
bought by the Federal Reserve has been increasing
except for the 1971-72 period when substantial
amounts were acquired by foreigners. The second
column for each time period indicates that changes in
the monetary base have closely paralleled Federal
Reserve purchases of Government securities. It is this
closeness that illustrates monetization of the Govern-
ment debt. The resulting increases in the monetary
base, of course, lead to the expansion of the money
stock, which is illustrated in the third column.
I doubt that monetization of debt has been a con-
scious act on the part of the Government or on the
part of the Federal Reserve System. Rather, I believe
the reason it has occurred lies in the relative visibility
of the three methods of financing Government expen-
ditures — taxes, borrowing from the public, and indi-
rect debt monetization. Elements of our society have
been continually demanding additional services from
the Government, such as more defense, more social
security, more medical security, and so forth. Since
these services absorb resources which are limited,
someone has to give up resources from other produc-
tive uses.
When these additional services are paid for with
increased taxes, the real resource cost is clearly visible
to all taxpayers since they find their disposable income
reduced. When they are financed by borrowing from
the public, the effect is immediately felt by those
competing for funds in capital markets and is visible
in the form of higher interest rates. But in the case of
debt monetization, the immediate and even the short-
run impact is neither an increase in taxes, nor an in-
creasein interest rates. And yet, real resources still are
being transferred from private to Government use.
The ultimate effect of this method of financing Gov-
ernment expenditures is manifested in an increase in
the price level — inflation — and this occurs only after
a substantial lag. It is the lack of immediate visibility
of the costs associated with this method of financing,
I believe, that has contributed to the process of infla-
tion. Once the inflation has been generated, a substan-
tial period of time is required to reverse it, and un-
fortunately this can be accomplished onlyby incurring
costs of lost output and higher unemployment.
Thus, over short periods of time it has appeared
that debt monetization gives society something for
nothing. And although this alternative may not have
been chosen consciously and the actions which mone-
tized the debt may not have been taken for that pur-
pose, the excessive concern over market interest rates
and the occurrence of large Government deficits led
to this course of action.
I can find no benefits accruing to the whole of
society from debt monetization, but the risks are very
serious and can be expressed in one word inflation.
In the way that I have described above, to a consid-
erable extent since the mid-1960s, deficit spending
financed indirectly by Federal Reserve purchases of
securities on the open market has meant an increase
in money which has exceeded the growth in our out-
put potential, and therefore has been inflationary.
Turning to another issue, it is my belief that shifting
emphasis of monetary actions because of a presumed
trade-off between inflation and unemployment has
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idea of a trade-off between unemployment and infla-
tion typically assumes that high rates of unemploy-
ment are associated with low inflation, and low rates
of unemployment are associated with high rates of
inflation. This view has led some analysts to argue
that policy actions can assist the economy in achieving
an acceptable combination of unemployment and
inflation.
However, experience indicates that the unemploy-
ment-inflation trade-off, if it exists at all, is purely a
short-run phenomenon. Chart I\~demonstrates that
there exists no long-run relationship between the un-
employment rate and the level of inflation. The only
striking features I find are that since 1952 the yearly
average unemployment rate has clustered around its
average (4.9 percent) for the whole period, and the
rate of inflation, regardless of the level of the unem-
ployment rate, has moved progressively higher since
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monetary growth which were longer than those of
slower growth, and the result was a rising average
growth rate of the money stock. More recently the
emphasis of the adopted policies again has been to
reduce inflation, hut the actions taken thus far have
not resulted in a reduction in the average growth rate
of the money supply.
It is my view that there will always he some normal
rate of unemployment as new workers enter the labor
market, as relative demands and supplies for labor
services change, and as workers simply leave present
jobs to find more rewarding ones elsewhere. Such a
level is not necessarily desirable, but rather it is a
level determined by the normal functioning of our
product and labor markets, given existing institutional
and social conditions.
Monetary actions canuot influence this normal level
of unemployment; other policies are necessary to at-
tack that problem. As a matter of fact, monetary ac-
tions taken in an effort to reduce unemployment have
contributed to increased inflationary pressures. Sub-
sequent attempts to arrest inflation have temporarily
fostered increased unemployment in addition to the
normal amount consistent with existing labor market
conditions.
My analysis of the unemployment-inflation trade-off
leads me to conclude that it is non-existent, except
possibly for very short intervals of time. Therefore,
with relatively stable monetary growth over a long
period, I believe it would be possible to have an es-
sentially stable average level of prices, and this could
be accomplished without accepting a permanently
higher unemployment rate. The desire to reduce the
average level of unemployment should be approached
through programs which reduce or eliminate institu-
tional rigidities and barriers to entry in labor markets,
which provide job training, and which improve infor-
mation regarding job availability.
In recent months a new proposal has been advanced
which, if adopted, would most likely lead to further
acceleration in the rate of monetary expansion,
thereby adding to inflationary pressures. It has been
suggested that it is appropriate for monetary and
fiscal authorities to stimulate aggregate demand dur-
ing periods when domestic production is curtailed by
some special event, such as the oil boycott, or when
foreign demand for a specific product, like wheat,
increases suddenly. The argument is that the resulting
price pressure from such non-recurring events is in-
evitable and that an expansionary aggregate demand
program is required to protect employment in the
case of a decrease in domestic production, and to
0
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In the past, emphasis of monetary policy actions
has, at various times, shifted between reducing infla-
tion and reducing the unemployment rate. For ex-
ample, according to the published policy Record,
since the early-1960s (except 1966 and 1969) a pri-
mary goal was lower unemployment, and expansionary
monetary policies were adopted to achieve it. In 1966
and 1969 emphasis was on achieving lower rates of
inflation, and restrictive monetary policies were ac-
cordingly adopted. However, on balance the actions
taken in the past decade resulted in periods of rapid
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protect consumer buying power in the case of an in-
crease in foreign demand. Unfortunately, the prob-
ability of achieving either of these goals with stimula-
tive monetary actions is very small and the costs in
terms of accelerated inflation are certain.
The main point to keep in mind is that the forces
that cause prices to rise in a specific market are very
different from those which cause inflation — a per-
sistent rise in the average price of all items traded in
the economy. The prices of individual items rise and
fall continuously, and an increase in a particular
price, even if it is the price of an important budget
item like food, is not necessarily an indication of gen-
era! inflationary pressures. In the absence of addi-
tional monetary stimulus to aggregate demand, price
increases in specific markets are a signal that either
the demand or supply conditions, or both, have
changed; not that total demand for all goods and
services has increased. Such price increases serve a
very useful function of allocating scarce resources ac-
cording to consumer preferences.
An increase in foreign demand for American pro-
ducts is not inflationary per se. It represents a shift in
the composition of demand for our output, but not an
inflationary increase in aggregate demand. Inflation
would occur if monetary actions were taken in order
to accommodate the price pressure in individual
commodity markets. In the case of some unforeseen
event such as a domestic crop failure or an embargo
on imports of raw materials, the productive capacity
of the economy is reduced. Most of the time the effect
is temporary, but, as in the case of the oil embargo,
the effect can be long-lasting. There is little that an
increase in aggregate demand can do to stimulate
more production in such a situation.
In my opinion, a monetary policy which results in
an increased growth of the money stock has no role to
play in accommodating the relative price effects of
autonomous changes in demand or supply in specific
markets. Such monetary actions would only raise the
overall rate of inflation. Temporary gains in output
and employment might be achieved, but the ultimate
effect would he only on the rate of change of prices
in general.
I now turn to my final topic — the contribution that
monetary policy can make to reducing the rate of
inflation and lowering market interest rates. My views
on this topic should by now be very obvious; mone-
tary actions can, and must, make a positive contribu-
tion. The interests of the whole economy would be
best served if the trend growth rate of the money
Page 8
stock were to be gradually, but persistently, reduced
from the high rates experienced in the recent past. I
believe that, once we achieved and maintained a 2 to
3 percent rate of money grosvth, both the rate of in-
flation and the level of interest rates would ulti-
mately decline to their levels of the early 1960s.
I believe such a policy of gradual, rather than
abrupt, reduction in the rate of monetary expansion
from the high average rate so far in the 1970 s, would
not have severely adverse effects on the growth of out-
put and employment. Such a gradual policy would
probably mean, however, that the period of com-
batting inflation and high interest rates would extend
through the balance of the 1970s.
Some analysts believe that if the Federal Reserve
sought to control the rate of growth of the money
supply within a fairly narrow range, unacceptable
short-run fluctuations in short-term interest rates
would be generated. Id onot believe that it is neces-
sary for the Federal Reserve to intervene systemati-
cally in financial markets in order to maintain orderly
conditions.
It seems to me that there are three basic parts to
this argument regarding the desirability of actions to
smooth short-run interest rate fluctuations. First, the
argument assumes that Federal Reserve actions in the
past have in fact reduced short-run fluctuations in
short-term interest rates compared to what they other-
wise would have been. As far as I am aware, there is
no substantial body of empirical evidence supporting
this claim. There is, however, a large and growing
body of evidence suggesting that highly organized
financial markets by themselves do not generate exces-
sive and unwarranted short-run interest rate fluc-
tuations.
Second, this argument assumes that by stabilizing
short-term rates the System can, in the short-run, sta-
bilize intermediate and long-term interest rates. Again,
Ia mnot aware of any empirical evidence in support
of this proposition.
Third, this position assumes that short-run fluctua-
tions in interest rates have a significant impact on the
ultimate goals of stabilization policy — namely, price
stability, a high level of employment, and economic
growth. I know of no reason to believe that moderat-
ing short-run fluctuations in short-term interest rates
has any significant stabilizing influence on prices, out-
put, or employment. Even within the context of the
well-known econometric forecasting models, stabiliza-
tion of short-term interest rates has almost no stabiliz-
ing influence on prices, output, or employment.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST 1974
Some would oppose my recommended course of
monetary policy on the grounds that it would not al-
low the Federal Reserve to perform its responsibility
of a lender of last resort; so I want to make my views
clear on this point. I believe it is possible that the
failure of a major hank or other corporation can, at
times, disrupt the smooth functioning of our financial
markets. In my opinion, the Federal Reserve has an
obligation to prevent the temporary problems of a
major institution from affecting financial markets and
perhaps even affecting the economy.
At the same time, however, Id onot think that the
System should subsidize inefficient management by
making funds available at interest rates well below
market rates, or be concerned about the losses that
stockholders of a basically unsound institution might
suffer. In the long-run, such actions can only weaken,
rather than strengthen, the financial system, as well
as the business community at large.
Any temporary assistance to a basically sound in-
stitution should he unwound in a re]ativeiy short pe-
riod of time. At the same time, the provision of funds
through the Federal Reserve discount window should
be matched by a sale of securities from the System’s
portfolio in order to prevent an expansion in the
monetary base and the money stock.
Carrying out the monetary policy actions that I
recommend could be greatly facilitated by comple-
mentary actions on the part of others. A balanced
Government budget would eliminate much of the
pressure on interest rates, thereby removing one cause
of accelerating money growth in the past. Legislation
removing impediments to the free functioning of our
product, labor, and financial markets would allow
these markets to adjust to monetary restraint more
rapidly, and without the severe dislocations of the
past.
It would also be helpful if all segments of our
society would realize that rapid monetary growth,
inflation, and high market interest rates go hand-in-
hand; that, once initiated, inflation cannot be elimi-
nated without some temporary costs in terms of slower
growth of output and employment; and that consid-
erable time will be required to reduce substantially
both the rate of inflation and the level of interest
rates. Such realizations would tend to mitigate the
short-run pressures that in the past have resulted in
postponements of efforts to curb inflation.
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